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Abstract
We report our recent simulations on the social processes which – in
our opinion – lie at the bottom of hate. First simulation deals with the
so-called Heider balance where initial purely random preferences split the
community into two mutually hostile groups. Second simulation shows
that once these groups are formed, the cooperation between them is going
to fail. Third simulation provides a numerical illustration of the process of
biased learning; the model indicates that lack of objective information is a
barrier to new information. Fourth simulation shows that in the presence
of a strong conflict between communities hate is unavoidable.
1 INTRODUCTION
To write that hate as a subject on a physicist’s desk is a challenge is an un-
derstatement. For obvious reasons, we are not able to comment what has been
written on hate only recently by philosophers, psychologists, sociologists and
historians. Still, having in mind what we can deduce about hate from our com-
puter simulations, we feel that it is at least more honest and clear to confess
how we imagine the role of the simulation itself in this kind of research.
The simulation is the part of research most safe. Not a surprise, that in
various sociophysical papers we the readers are fed with computational details.
The devil is before and after; in the model assumptions and in the interpretation
of the results. We the authors are somewhat conscious of these dangers, but
this knowledge is even not necessary to do what we actually do. Actually in
most cases we meet the problems with silence. If, then, our simulations could
be of interest for sociologically oriented readers, the reality described by means
of these simulations must be simple – this is a necessary condition. As a rule,
the input of the model contains some numbers even if their measurement is
dubious; a computational model is always expressed with numbers and we are
forced to imagine that data are accessible in this or that way. The output –
the results of the simulation – should be detectable qualitatively; only then we
are able to compare with reality at least the existence of effects obtained in our
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computers. Summarizing, a typical result of the simulation is that in these and
these conditions some effect does appear. We the authors like to think that we
simulate some kind of a deterministic machine, the action of which is described
with ”social” variables. This kind of understanding is not far from what can
be found in sociological textbooks. ”A social mechanism (...) is a constellation
of entities and activities that are linked to one another in such a way that they
regularly bring about a particular type of outcome” (Hedstro¨m, 2005, p. 11).
”Humans are not numbers.” Wrong; we just don’t want to be treated as
numbers - this statement comes from a famous sociophysicist (Stauffer, 2003),
as a mark of old discussion about the unique character of human being in Na-
ture. One of consequences of a possible consensus in this matter would be to
decide to what extent the character of laws in social sciences is the same as
in physics. While such a conclusion seems to be far, it seems appropriate to
specify at least approximately the conditions, when we expect that human be-
haviour is to some extent deterministic. In our opinion, this is possible when
the exceptional character of external circumstances meets standard individuals,
who can be represented – for the purposes of the simulation - by numbers. We
do not expect that these individuals show any outstanding intelligence, knowl-
edge or heroism. If me meet them on street, we are not more impressed, than
some other time with other people. On the contrary, the demand of an external
situation should hit basic human needs, as physiological needs, needs of safety
or of belongingness (Maslow, 1950). In these conditions we can expect that
individual characteristics of people becomes less important; what we learnt in
our lives seems to be not applicable. These rare situations provide fuel for wide
spectrum of social simulations, from the theory of rational choice (von Neumann
and Morgenstern, 1944; Szabo´ and Fa´th, 2008) to human bodies as moving par-
ticles under some social forces (Helbing, 1993).
We want to supplement these vague considerations by two remarks. First
is the natural position of our field of research between necessity and free will.
A subject under full control is out of scientific interest – everything we need is
known. On the contrary, a research on subjects which are completely uncon-
trolled has no vital applications. What is of interest is at the border, where
results of research can put forward our abilities. An example of what is at the
border in human life is a social norm; after years of efforts some people are able
to modify their norms to some extent, while others live and die in the same
moral environment. Norms form the sociological context, and human behavior
cannot be evaluated in a separation from her or his social norms. Summariz-
ing, in our opinion social norms are at the center of any valuable sociological
research. In particular, relation of individuals to hate – whom? – is the subject
of a social norm, which can be constitutive for a community.
Second remark is some continuation of what is told above about standard
people and non-standard situation. The main handicap of social sciences when
compared to physics is the unrepeatability of the measurement. In opinion of
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at least one coauthor of this text, this difficulty comes more from the context
than from the people. People are unique, yes, but this kind of uniqueness is less
relevant in situations which we would like to simulate. The point is that it is
possible to exchange actors leaving the piece untouched, but not the opposite. If
historical events form a pattern, we can talk about a mechanism in the sense of
Hedstro¨m, which appears more than once. This is rare, but we the researchers
must assume that this is possible.
Hate as a socially mediated state of mind overlaps with themes which are
well established in socially oriented simulations (Castellano et al, 2009): social
norms, cooperation and public opinion. Their common content is a picture of a
heterogeneous community, where seemingly unimportant differences can lead to
a split into groups. As a consequence, cooperation and contact between mem-
bers of different groups is deteriorated, mutual understanding is substituted by
ignorance, finally the social labeling and hostility emerge between members of
different groups. These processes lie at the bottom of hate.
Below we are going to report our recent simulations on these social processes.
First simulation described in Section II deals with the so-called Heider balance
(Ku lakowski, 2007) where initial purely random preferences split the commu-
nity into two mutually hostile groups. Three subsequent sections describe three
other simulations. Second simulation (Ku lakowski and Gawron´ski, 2009) shows
that once these groups are formed, the cooperation between them is going to
fail. Third simulation (Kulakowski, 2009; Malarz et al, 2009) provides a numer-
ical illustration of the process of biased learning; the model indicates that lack
of objective information is a barrier to new informations. Fourth simulation
(Ku lakowski, 2006) is devoted to the impossibility of cooperation with enemies
in the presence of a strong conflict. At the end, there is also some place for
conclusions.
2 HEIDER BALANCE
Our story on hate begins from almost nothing. Let us consider personal contacts
in some small community. For each two individuals their mutual acceptance de-
pends on intangible details, often imperceptible for others. For some of them
this acceptance is better, for some it is worse; if we measure their values with
any method, we find that they evolve in time. We can refer to (Murray, 2002)
where a method was presented of a measurement of the dynamics of marital
interactions. As it was observed in some cases, a mutual exchange of repulsive
signals can break off the tie. When such a conflict emerges in front of the com-
munity, it influences also the quality of other contacts and so on. Everybody
has to decide how the event modified his or her relations with the others. As
the arising tensions are often in mutual contradiction, the task is quite complex.
Faced with such contradictory requests, people find however a way to re-
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Figure 1: The distance from the state of Heider balance, measured in the number
of ”negative” triangles, against time.
solve their internal conflicts. Namely, they modify some of their opinions and
attitudes in such a way that their coherence is restored. This mechanism was rec-
ognized in a series of laboratory experiments by Festinger and other researchers
(Festinger, 1957; Aronson, 1992) and it is known as removing the cognitive dis-
sonance. In this way some negative ties become positive, some positive ones
become negative. The final result can be somewhat surprising: the whole com-
munity becomes divided into two mutually hostile groups. Still, all the ties
within each group are friendly. This state does not evolve any more, because
the situation is clear: everybody knows who is enemy and who is friend. More-
over, each friend of other friend is a friend, each enemy of a friend and each
friend of an enemy are enemies. This kind of equilibrium is known as the Hei-
der balance (Heider, 1958).
The ideas of the cognitive dissonance and of the Heider balance found an em-
pirical illustration in a controlled psychological experiment by Zachary (Zachary,
1977). For two years, he observed a group of 34 members of a karate club. These
observations allowed to construct a friendship networks and to store it in the
form of a matrix. Later, a conflict emerged between the administrator of the
club and the club’s instructor and the group split into two camps (Girvan and
Newman, 2002).
4
Obviously, importance of the work by Zachary for social networks was recog-
nized by sociologists (Hage, 1979; Wasserman and Faust, 1994). As described by
Freeman (Freeman, 2008), new impact in sociological applications of the graph
theory was given by physicists. Since the publication of the paper of Girvan and
Newman (Girvan and Newman, 2002), tens of algorithms have been applied to
the Zachary’s data. The idea was to check if a given algorithm can reproduce
the actual division of the club members.
Now we have to be more specific. The common aim of all these methods was
to determine clusters of graph nodes, where nodes are connected more densely
within the clusters than between them. A careful reader notices, that the term
”more densely” is only qualitative. A mathematically-oriented reader guesses
that the task is probabilistic: we set a hypothesis, that clusters do exist, and
we extract these clusters from the graph. The actual data may support the
hypothesis with some probability. At the end we decide if the obtained proba-
bility is large enough. If yes, we accept the obtained cluster structure. Recent
reviews on the computational methods of cluster identification can be found in
(Fortunato and Castellano, 2009; Fortunato, 2009).
The simulation which we want to underscore here was designed specifically
for the problem of the cognitive dissonance. Suppose that each two nodes are
connected, what means that every group member has some relations with each
other. In the simplest model the links, which represent the friendly or hostile
relations between people, are marked with signs: plus or minus, respectively.
The cognitive dissonance appears when one negative link makes a triangle with
two positive ones, or when three negative links make a triangle. The former
case means that two friends of somebody are mutually hostile. The latter is
that three individuals are mutually hostile. Lack of cognitive dissonance is then
equivalent to a simple condition that the product of three links which make a
triangle must be positive. On the contrary, the number of triangles where this
product is negative can serve as a quantitative measure of the cognitive disso-
nance.
The Heider balance attracted attention of several authors – for a review of
recent computations see (Ku lakowski, 2007). In our calculation (Ku lakowski et
al, 2005), the links are represented by real numbers A(i, j) between, say, -1 and
+1, where i, j are the numbers of nodes. Within this range, their time evolution
is governed by the differential equation
dA(i, j)
dt
=
∑
k
A(i, k)A(k, j) (1)
In other words, the relation A(i, j) between individuals i and j improves, if most
other indviduals k are either friends of both or enemies of both. In these cases,
the product A(i, k)A(k, j) is positive. On the contrary, if many individuals k
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are either enemies of i and friends of j or the opposite, the relation between i
and j gets worse: A(i, j) decreases. This is a direct mathematical realization of
the removal of the cognitive dissonance. Indeed, the simulation ends in the state
without ”negative” triangles; this is the state of balance in the Heider sense.
Taking into account the continuous scale of relations allows to observe the
character of the time evolution. What is surprising in the obtained data is
that the number of the ”negative” triangles evolves initially slowly. At a given
moment, however, the rate of changes increases very abruptly; an example is
presented in Fig. 1. There is yet another interesting result: our Eq. 1 with the
Zachary initial data reproduces exactly the division of 34 club members into
two groups (Ku lakowski et al, 2005).
What we can learn about hate from this simulation is absurdity of its origin.
Here we have a real psychological mechanism, namely removing of the cogni-
tive distance. We apply it each day to make our emotional environment more
ordered and clear. With this mechanism our hostilities directed towards ca-
sual people, formed by occasional events and sometimes irrational thoughts, are
transformed into a strong, unambiguous and ordered prejudice against a well
defined group. Everybody whom we respect, i.e. each member of our group,
confirms that this prejudice is justified. In our group, the group of respected
people, this prejudice is a social norm.
What is next?
3 IN-GROUP COOPERATION
In this section we examine one of the currently investigated mechanisms of co-
operation, namely the competitive altruism (Roberts, 1998). We show that this
mechanism is not immune for the limitation of cooperation to the own player’s
group. This means, that cooperation does not protect against hate; we can just
cooperate with some and hate others.
The problem of cooperation has been discussed usually in terms of the Pris-
oner’s Dilemma, abbreviated as PD. In some sense, this dilemma is a challenge
for our culture, as it demonstrates its clash with the individual rationality.
There is a story which justifies the term PD; as it is commonly known, we pre-
fer another example. Two individuals are imprisoned, and the food is provided
between 3.00 AM and 6 AM. A loyal strategy is to get up near, say, 7.00 AM
, and to share food evenly. However, the portions are scanty and it is tempt-
ing to get up earlier and eat more. The dilemma is to sleep till 7.00 AM or
not; once both lie in wait for food, they don’t sleep well. In an adopted termi-
nology about PD, to sleep peacefully means ”to cooperate”, and to lie in wait
means ”to defect”. The amount of situations which could illustrate PD is innu-
merable, from the Kyoto Protocol back to the biblical story on the Prodigal Son.
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Standard representation of PD in game theory is the payoff matrix (Straffin,
1993)
Cooperate Defect
Cooperate R, R S, T
Defect T, S U, U
When a cooperator meets a cooperator, the payoff is R (reward) for both.
When both of them defect, both get U (uncooperative). However, once a co-
operator meets a defector, the latter gets T (temptation), and the former gets
S (sucker’s payoff). The game can be classified as PD if S < U < R < T .
Additional condition is that T + S < 2R, to exclude the cyclic strategy when
one cooperate and other defects or the opposite; this strategy is not PD. As
R < T and S < U , to defect is always better than to cooperate; then, according
to game theory, a rational player should defect. The point is that if both defect,
they get less than if both cooperate.
As we see, PD is designed as to disable cooperation of rational players. Still
we can imagine that people cooperate for reasons other than a simple individual
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Figure 3: Graph visualization of strong cooperation within two groups, with
players with negative altruism left aside; κ = 0.3
profit. These reasons can be kinship and direct or indirect reciprocity; for recent
reviews on cooperation theory see for example (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2005).
Motivation by kinship is limited to the own group. Motivation by reciprocity
can also lead to in-group favoritism, if the group members expect reciprocation
from the same group (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2005). Before we switch to the
motivation by the competitive altruism, let us quote one social experiment on
randomly formed groups.
The aim of this research (Goette et al, 2006) was to check if the mere depen-
dence to a group causes a non-selfish behaviour between its members. The PD
experiment with some modifications was conducted in the frames of the Swiss
army, where the assignment of individuals to platoons was completely random.
Still, after three-weeks training, the cooperation between members of the same
platoon was significantly higher, than between members of different platoons.
We note that hostility between different platoons has not been observed – for-
tunately hate does not appear so easily.
We refer to this experiment as it provides a demonstration, that the forma-
tion of a group or a community is equivalent to the formation of some social
norm, which unifies the group. This equivalence was clearly expressed by a
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historian, Elias Bickerman: ”The first need of any social system is to create
incentives to make people do more work than that required by their immediate
wants.” (Bickerman, 1973, p.73). This means also that expectation of cooper-
ation of members of the same group is stronger. In longer time scale, such an
expectation becomes trust.
The theory of competitive altruism (Roberts, 1998; Van Vugt et al, 2007)
explores the cooperation as a demonstration of resources. First assumption is
that individuals differ in their level of altruism. Second is that people compete
to establish altruistic reputation. In accordance of the Zahavi handicap princi-
ple (Zahavi and Zahavi, 1997), the signal must be costful to be reliable. The
altruistic behaviour fulfils this condition. Our question is, if this mechanism
can be responsible for the group formation, with enhancement of cooperation
within groups. Then we could draw a line from the Goette’s experiment to the
concept of competitive altruism. The problem of hate is left aside till the end
of this section.
To address the above question, we resort to a simulation. The model is
adopted from our previous work (Ku lakowski and Gawron´ski, 2009); having the
paper published we found that its assumptions can be justified within the theory
of competitive altruism. These assumptions are:
1. Agents i differ in their altruism level e(i).
2. The probability P (i, j) that an agent i cooperates with another agent j in-
creases with the altruism of i and with the reputation of j. Namely, we used
the sum P (i, j) = e(i) +W (i), limited to the range (0,1).
3. The reputation W (i) of i increases when i cooperates, and decreases when i
defects.
Most important result of the model is shown in Fig. 2. As we see, the prob-
ability that i-th agent meets a cooperative co-player depends on the altruism
of i. Most altruistic agents experience cooperation in seventy percent of games.
This is true for any payoff we would like to assign to particular outcomes of PD.
Then, the values of the payoffs are not relevant.
To investigate the case of two groups, the scheme of simulation was modified
(Gawron´ski et al, 2009) by adding a constant κ to the probability of coop-
eration if the co-player belongs to the same group; in the opposite case, the
same constant κ was subtracted. This modification altered the matrix of the
probability of cooperation P (i, j). If the constant κ is large enough, this ma-
trix shows a cluster structure; the method is described in (Krawczyk, 2008).
Namely, two clusters could be detected: agents in the same clusters cooperate
more frequently, than agents in different clusters. A half of agents is left besides
the clusters; still, they are more connected either to one or to the other group.
This structure is visualized in Fig. 3.
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In this way we made a second step on our path. First was the prejudice.
Second is the loss of trust in members of group or community other, than the
agent’s own group.
4 BIASED LEARNING
Third step to hate is the lack of understanding.
At the beginning of Section II the method was remarked of a measurement
of dynamics of marital status (Murray, 2001). The method was to distinguish
couples of low and high risk level by controlling the signals they send during
a conversation. These signals, coded into a special system, were gathered by
Gottman and Levenson (Gottman and Levenson, 1992) for 73 couples in 1983.
The couples were investigated again in 1987. Among the high risk couples, the
percentage of divorced was 19 against 7 in low risk group. Then, the character
of conversation allowed to predict the future.
In the case of political differences, the outcome can be even more explicit.
Character of anonymous statements about politics in the Internet was investi-
gated by Sobkowicz and Sobkowicz (Sobkowicz and Sobkowicz, 2009). In many
cases, comments of internauts could be classified as an exchange of insults, with
increasing hostility. The point is more than often, the discussion was dominated
by adherents of two major Polish political parties, both Center-Right: PiS and
PO. The analysis shown that to be hated by opponents is the desired goal as well
as to be admired by supporters. What is the origin of this extreme behaviour?
We are going to look for the answer in our third simulation, which deals with
the public opinion.
The motivation for the simulation comes from the Zaller theory on the mass
opinion (Zaller, 1992). It is based on four ideas: ”The first is that citizens vary
in their habitual attention to politics and hence in their exposure to political
information and argumentation in the media. The second is that people are
able to react critically to the arguments they encounter only to the extent that
they are knowledgeable about political affairs. The third is that citizens do not
typically carry around in their heads fixed attitudes on every issue on which a
pollster may happen to inquire; rather, they construct ”opinion statements” on
the fly as they confront each new issue. The fourth is that, in constructing their
opinion statements, people make greatest use of ideas that are, for one reason
or another, most immediately salient to them...” (Zaller, 1992).
Keeping – as we believe – the content of these ideas, we reformulated the
mathematical scheme of the simulation (Ku lakowski, 2009). Further general-
ization of our formalism (Ku lakowski and Gronek, 2009; Malarz et al, 2009) is
close to the Deffuant model of public opinion (Deffuant et al, 2000). Therefore
we term the formulation as the Zaller-Deffuant model from now on. Its core is
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as follows. Individuals are the subject of a stream of messages produced by the
mass media. An individual is represented by a set of messages which she/he
received in the past. Further, a message is represented as a point on the plane
of issues. The condition to receive a new message is that its distance from any
previously accepted message should be shorter than some critical distance a.
This critical distance is a measure of the mental capacity of an individual. Each
individual starts at it first message with position selected randomly at the plane
of issues. Once a new message appears, it is received or not by an individuals,
depending on her/his history. The communication between the individuals is
maintained by messages, formulated and sent by the individuals. The position
of such a message is determined by a temporal average of the messages received
previously by the sender.
The output of the simulation is the distribution of probability p that an
opinion formulated by an individual on a given issue is YES. For each individ-
ual, this probability can be calculated as
p =
∑
t
xtΘ(xt)∑
t
|xt|
(2)
where Θ(x) = 0 for x < 0, Θ(x) = 1 for x > 0, and the sums are performed over
messages accepted at time t. In particular, p is equal to unity (YES for sure) if
all messages received by the individual are on the positive side of the OY axis.
On the contrary, p = 0 (NO for sure) if the x-th coordinate of all these messages
is negative. The obtained distribution of p is calculated over all individuals.
In the simulation, the system as a whole is the subject of a specific test. The
stream of messages from the media is symmetric with respect to the axis OY.
Then, the individuals have no more arguments for YES than for NO and the
opposite. Smart individuals should recognize this symmetry and their proba-
bilities p should be close to 1. Indeed, if the critical distance a is large enough,
the distribution of p has a maximum close to p = 1/2. However, for small a the
distribution of p shows a bimodal character: two maxima appear, for p negative
and p positive (Fig. 4). This means, that small mental capacity leads to extreme
opinions (Ku lakowski, 2009). In other words, less clever people are more sure of
their opinions. This paradoxical result can be seen as a sociological counterpart
of the physical concept of the spontaneous symmetry breaking.
Here we are interested in the consequences of the interpersonal communica-
tion. It appears that this form of interaction deteriorates the central maximum
of the distribution P (p), as shown also in Fig. 4 (Ku lakowski and Gronek, 2009;
Malarz et al, 2009). This indicates, that the communication between the group
members can maintain prejudice. Such a conclusion coincides with the warnings
against the groupthink (Janis, 1972). Even if individuals are endowed with high
capacity, the exchange of messages leads to a formation of one single opinion,
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which is an average over some finite set. The stream of incoming messages is
dominated by those exchanged within the system. As a consequence, all indi-
vidual opinions are the same. The community becomes perfectly homogeneous.
Suppose now that this community contacts with another one, with different
opinion. Till this moment, neither mutual understanding nor tolerance was
necessary. Individual differences were hidden to maintain the social coherence
– now they are exposed. If hostility appears, we should not be surprised.
5 CASE OF GHETTO
To get hate, the last missing ingredient is a spark. It can be imperceptibly
small: a discussion between shepherds, a soldier’s joke, a tabloid article. Real
wars do not break out like that, real wars are provoked by serious people, who
want to be sure on the results of their actions. A good provocation is a murder
of a respected person, as Mohandas Ghandi, Martin King, Icchak Rabin. We
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do not need to discuss an initiation – this is easy. We are interested in the
question, if – in the presence of full conflict - the development of hate can be
spontaneously halted.
The subject of our last simulation is a ghetto. Historically, the term ”ghetto”
is ambiguous. Here we use it to describe the situation where the position of peo-
ple is defined by two traits: i) an attempt of an inhabitant of ghetto to leave the
area makes his situation worse, ii) human laws, as understood by inhabitants,
are broken by an external power (Ku lakowski, 2006). The decision is limited to
two strategies: to support the resistance or to obey the rules imposed by the ex-
ternal power. In the psychological dimension, the choice is to hate or not to hate.
In our considerations, we refer to the Maslow theory (Maslow, 1950) re-
marked at the introduction. According to this theory, we fulfil our needs in a
definite order. The physiological needs are most basic and they must be fulfilled
at first. Once they are satisfied, we start to bother about safety. Next is the
needs for belongingness, esteem and self-actualization, in this order. Our point
is that vital decisions of people are biased by their needs. This is in accordance
of the fourth postulate of Zaller: ”in constructing their opinion statements,
people make greatest use of ideas that are, for one reason or another, most im-
mediately salient to them” (Zaller, 1992), quoted in the preceding section. In
other words, the decision of resistance and hate is taken in connection of the
actual need, yet not satisfied.
Even in a ghetto, people differ in their position and possibilities. There are
some, who struggle to satisfy their physiological needs: water and food. These
efforts makes their behavior determined and predictable. They have no oppor-
tunity to express their hate – this is too costly. Actually, the simplest way to
reduce the resistance of people is to reduce their life to this physiological level.
This method is well known and still being applied (Politkovskaya, 2003). There
are some other people, who are relatively safe; they can bother about their
belongingness, love, friendship and perhaps the higher needs . Their decisions
about resistance depend on their individual social entanglements; an attempt
to simulate this would be idle. Who remains are the people who concentrate
on their safety. Their decision about resistance is connected to this need. Will
they be more safe, when obeying the rules of the external power? This is the
question most salient for them.
The simulation consists in the numerical solution of the so-called Master
equation (van Kampen, 1981)
dr
dt
= −u(r)r + w(r)(1 − r) (3)
where r is the time dependent probability of the choice of resistance and hate,
u(r) is the probability of changing the decision from resistance to submission,
13
w(r) is the probability of changing the decision from submission to resistance.
What is sought after is the function r(t), while the functions u(r) and w(r)
should be given. We note that on the contrary to standard application of this
equation in physics of magnetism, w(r) and u(r) are not expected to be equal
for r = 1/2. The shape of these functions is difficult to be determined, but we
can state two details: i) w(r) increases with r, and ii) u(r) decreases with r.
These facts follow directly from a simple intuition: once everybody resists, it
is difficult to submit; once submission is common, conversions to resistance are
rare. In physics we speak on a positive feedback.
To demonstrate the consequences, let us select the simplest choice of two
linear functions: u(r) = a(1 − r), w(r) = br. Then there are two constant
solutions: r = 0 (total submission) and r = 1 (total resistance). First solution
is stable if a > b, second one is stable if b > a. In this simple case, the time-
dependent solution is available
r(t) =
r0
r0 + (1− r0) exp[(a− b)t]
(4)
where r0 is the initial value of r. As we see, the result is determined by the sign
of the expression a−b. If it is positive, the submission prevails. If it is negative,
the resistance is common.
We should add two remarks. First is that the functions u(r) and w(r) re-
main unknown. Moreover, our propositions of their linear shape can be treated
as useful approximations only within some range of p. However, the qualitative
character of the solution is preserved also for another choice of these functions
– see the comparison in Fig. 5. Second remark appeals to the political reality.
Once an individual chose the resistance, his safety will be not improved when
he decides back to submit, as – sooner or later – he will be called to account by
the external power. That is why it is reasonable to expect that a is always less
than b. For the external power, there are two strategies: either to declare an
amnesty to improve the safety of ex-opponents, or to delay the problem, keeping
both constants a and b as small as possible. However, if b is already large, the
second strategy is not possible and the first strategy is ineffective.
At the beginning of this section we asked the question, if – in the presence of
full conflict - the development of hate can be spontaneously halted. Our results
indicate, that the answer is no.
6 CONCLUSION
We demonstrated four schemes of simulations, intended to reflect some features
of real sociological mechanisms. Three of them - prejudice, distrust and mis-
understanding towards members of other communities - can contribute to the
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Figure 5: Stationary values of the probability r against the difference b− a for
linear and exponential forms of the functions u(r) and w(r). The exponential
functions are chosen after (Ku lakowski, 2006).
development of hate. Although they seem necessary, they are not sufficient con-
ditions of this process. On the other hand, they are sometimes functional for a
given community. If this is the case, the community develops social norms to
support prejudice, distrust and misunderstanding, and these norms are obeyed
in particular by numerous good, healthy and agreeable individuals.
The last calculation treats with the case when the hate is already present.
The society is perhaps unified against the external power, perhaps split. In both
cases to hate enemies is a duty and an identification. This kind of hate unifies
the community; people have no choice to hate or not to hate, they have only the
choice to hate whom. A demonstration of this kind of hate is equivalent to a
demonstration of friendship to members of the own community. On the contrary
to a private hate against a given person, this kind of hate is not destructive for
the psyche. This kind of hate does not preclude friendship, sacrifice and love;
it just excludes the members of hated communities.
It is not our intention here to analyze how this kind of hate turned out to be
destructive for human race, even if it is still functional for some communities.
Today we are educated enough to know that it is possible to live without hate;
15
then the human nature only enables hate, but does not imply it. Therefore,
the research on hate should be directed more to communities and their social
norms, than to rare twists of individual minds.
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